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CHTA]SLE CHOICE AND THE CRITICS
CARL H. ESBECK:::
Charitable choice is now part of three federal social service
programs. The provision first appeared in the Welfare Reform Act
of 1996; 1 two years later it was incorporated into the Community
Services Block Grant Act of 1998,2 and most recently President Clin-

ton made it part of the Children's Health Act of 20003 on October
17, 2000. In each of these programs, government funds are placed
directly into the hands of private social service providers via grants
and purchase of service contracts.
Charitable choice intenveaves three fundamental principles,
and each of these receives prominence in the legislation. First, the
statute prohibits the government from discriminating with regard
to religion when determining whether providers are eligible to deliver social services under these programs. 4 Rather than examining
the nature of the service provider, charitable choice focuses on the
nature of the services and the means by which they are provided.
The relevant question concerning provider eligibility is not "Who
are you?" but "What can you do?".
* Isabella Wade and Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law, University of MissouriColumbia, and currently serving as Director of the Center for Community and
Faith-Based Initiatives, United States Department ofJustice.
1. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(Welfare Reform Act or PRWORA), 42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. II 1996). Section
604a applies to federal revenue streams: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
and Welfare to Work monies. See P.L. No. 104-193, § 103(a), 110 Stat. 2112-2114
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.). Welfare to Work finds were
made subject to PRWORA in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. Balanced Budget Act
of 1997, P.L. No. 105-33, § 5001, 111 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 403 (a)).
2. Pub. L. No. 105-285, § 201, 112 Stat. 2702, 2749 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9920 (Supp. IV 1995-1999)).
3. Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3305, 114 Stat. 1212, 1212-15 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 300x-65) (concerning expenditures for substance abuse treatment and
prevention). Somewhat redundantly, drug abuse and prevention expenditures
were again made subject to a charitable choice provision in the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, signed by President Clinton on December 21, 2000.
This Act was incorporated by reference in the Consolidated Appropriation Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 144, 114 Stat. 2763 (amending Title V of the Public
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 290aa); to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 290kk). The
confusion was no doubt the result of the harried actions of a lame-duck 106&
Congress.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) and (c).

17

HeinOnline -- 57 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 17 2000

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

57/2000

Second, the statute imposes on government the duty not to intrude into the religious autonomy of faith-based providers. Charitable choice extends a guarantee to each participating faith-based
organization ("FBO") that the organization "shall retain its independence from Federal, State, and local governments, including
such organization's control over the definition, development, practice, and expression of its religious beliefs."5- A private right of action to sue a government that tries to renege on that duty gives real
teeth to the guarantee. 6 Additionally, there are prohibitions on
specific types of governmental interference, such as demands to
strip religious symbols from the walls of FBOs and bans on regulations requiring FBOs to adjust their governing boards to reflect7
some "ethnic or gender balance" thought more politically correct.
Third, the statute imposes on both government and participating FBOs the duty not to abridge certain rights of the ultimate beneficiaries of these programs. Charitable choice not only protects
the rights of religious conscience, but also seeks to expand the
number of providers from which the beneficiaries can choose to
receive services, including the choice of a religious provider. Each
of these federal social service programs has a secular purpose,
namely, helping the poor and needy. They seek to achieve this object by providing resources in the most effective and efficient means
available. The purpose of the program is not, of course, to benefit
the participating social service providers, whether secular or religious. Rather, the purpose of the program is to benefit the poor and
needy. Hence, it is they who are the ultimate beneficiaries.
I will touch on these three principles below, and do so in reverse order.

In programs subject to charitable choice, when funding goes
directly to the social service providers, 8 the ultimate beneficiaries
are empowered with a choice. Beneficiaries who want to receive
services from an FBO may do so, provided that the FBO has other5. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d)(1).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(i).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d) (2).
8. Charitable choice contemplates both direct and indirect forms of aid. ,12
U.S.C. § 604a(a) (1). Some statutory rights and duties pertain only to direct
funding.
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wise qualified for a grant or service contract." On the other hand, if
a beneficiary objects on religious grounds to receiving services at an
FBO, then the state is required to provide equivalent services at an
alternative provider.' 0 This is the "choice" in charitable choice.
Choosing to receive services at an FBO is as much an exercise of
religious freedom as is the right not to be served at a provider objectionable for reasons of religious conscience. Civil libertarians express much concern for the latter choice, whereas they often
overlook the former. Charitable choice regards these choices as
equally important.
If a beneficiary selects an FBO that receives funding, the provider cannot discriminate against beneficiaries on account of their
religion or their refusal to participate actively in a religious practice." Protection of the ultimate beneficiaries was bolstered in the
charitable choice provisions relating to substance abuse in the Children's Health Act of 2000. Now beneficiaries not only have the
right of choice and protection from discrimination, but also must
2
receive actual notice of these rights.'
II
If the availability of government money should undermine the
religious character of FBOs, then charitable choice will have failed.
If the availability of government funding should cause FBOs to become dependent on government or should it silence their prophetic voice, then charitable choice will have failed. Accordingly,
charitable choice acts to safeguard the "religious character" of faithbased organizations. FBOs' institutional autonomy is protected to
enable them to succeed at what they do so well, namely helping the
poor and needy in a holistic wkay.13 Protecting autonomy is also required to persuade reluctant FBOs to participate in government
9. It may be that no FBOs successfully compete for a grant or service contracL
Charitable choice is not a guarantee that aid will flow to FBOs. Charitable choice
guarantees only that FBOs will not be discriminated against with regard to religion.

10. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(e) (1).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(g).
12. See Children's Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3305, 114 Stat.
1212, 1214 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-65(e)(2)). Of course, nothing in
prior versions of charitable choice prevents states from giing actual notice of beneficiary rights. It would be prudent to provide notice of rights whether required by
the legislation or not, but the absence of a requirement in older versions of the law
hardly rises to the level of a constitutional concern.
13. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Jigious
Freedom" Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NoTrE Dx.'E L RE%-. 581, 629-31 (1995);
Rebecca G. Rees, "If W Recant, Would M Qualih': Exclusion of Rdigious Provider
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programs, something FBOs are far less likely to do if they face inva4
sive or compromising regulations.'
One of the most important of these guarantees of institutional
autonomy is the ability to select staff on a religious basis. FBOs can
hardly be expected to sustain their religious vision without the ability to employ individuals who share the tenets and practices of the
faith. The guarantee is central to each organization's freedom to
define its own mission according to the dictates of its conscience.
Accordingly, in addition to the broad guarantee of "independence"
from government, charitable choice specifically provides that FBOs
need not alter their policies of "internal governance" formed as a
matter of religious faith1 5 and that FBOs retain their exemption
from federal employment discrimination laws. 16 While it is essential that FBOs be permitted to make employment decisions based
on religious considerations, FBOs are not exempted from federal
civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,
color, national origin, gender, age, and disability;
these laws apply
17
to FBOs as they do to all other providers.
As a general proposition, FBOs must comply with existing state
and local employment nondiscrimination laws. These laws were enacted pursuant to each state's police power. Some states and municipalities also have nondiscrimination laws and procurement
policies adopted pursuant to governmental spending power. When
these spending power laws do not permit FBOs to select staff on the
basis of faith commitments, the laws are not enforceable against
FBOs acting pursuant to charitable choice revenue streams. This is
because the federal statutory guarantees in charitable choice that
from State Social Service Voucher Programs, 56 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1291, 1315 n. 124
(1999).
14. See Esbeck, supra note 13; Megan Twoheg, CharitableChoice Grows, but so Do

Questions, 32 THE NAT'L J. 3254; Jeffrey Rosen, Why the Catholic Church Shouldn't
Have To Hire Gays, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 26, 2001, at 16.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d) (2) (A).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (preserving a recipient religious organization's exemption under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1).
17. See Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (199i)

(prohibiting recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating on the
basis of race, color, or national origin); Title IX of the Educational Amendments
of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88 (prohibiting discrimination in educational institu-

tions on the basis of sex or visual impairment); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (prohibiting programs or activities that receive

federal financial assistance from discriminating against othenvise qualified disabled individuals); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1994) (prohibiting federally assisted

programs from discriminating on the basis of age).
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promise to protect the "religious character" and "internal governance" of FBOs preempt contrary provisions in state and local Iaws.' s
Occasionally the charge is made that charitable choice is "go%emnment-funded job discrimination." This is untrue. The purpose
of the funding is not to create jobs. Rather than "funding job discrimination," the government's object is funding social services for
the poor and needy. Whether the social service provider is an FBO
with employment policies rooted in its religion is probably unknown to the government, and that is the way it ought to be. The
discrimination, if there is any, is not "state action" in the sense of
that term in Fourteenth Amendment doctrine,' 9 because it is the
FBO that is discriminating on the basis of religion in its staffing
decisions, not the government. Moreover, the private act of discrimination by an FBO does not result from intolerance or malice.
Rather, the FBO is acting positively-and understandably so-in accord with the dictates of its sincerely held religious convictions. If
FBOs are not allowed to operate in accord with their own sense of
mission, then they will not be able to sustain the impressive record
they now have of successfully helping the poor and needy.

18. This is not unlike when claims of religious freedom override state laws
that protect citizens from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status. See, e.g., Altman v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., 80 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1166, 1170-71 (D. Minn. 1999) (sexual orientation); Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d
1160, 1161, 1164-66 (Mass. 1985) (sexual orientation); Walker ". First Presbyterian
Church, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 762, 764-65 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980) (sexual
orientation); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E. 2d 233, 235, 23841 (Mass. 1994)
(reversing summaryjudgment in defendant landlord's favor and remanding to the
lower court to determine whether state had a compelling interest in enforcing its
law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status, where such law imposed a substantial burden on defendant's religious practice); Arriaga v. Loma
Linda Univ., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619, 620-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming lower
court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit against her employer, a non-profit religious corporation, because state's fair employment statute did not apply to such corportions, so defendant's dismissal of plaintiff for violating defendant's religious tenets
was not actionable); Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4, 9-11 (Minn. 1990) (holding that state constitution permitted defendant to refuse to rent to unmarried
couples in accordance with defendant's religious beliefs, despite state statute
prohibiting marital status discrimination).
19. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002-12 (1982) (holding that pernsive
regulation and receipt of government funding at private nursing homes do not
make nursing home decisions state action); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,
(1982) (holding that private school heavily funded by state is not state actor);
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (stating that mere acquiescence by the law in private actions of warehouse does not convert the acts into
those of the state).
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A religious organization favoring the employment of those of
like-minded faith is comparable to an environmental organization
favoring employees devoted to environmentalism, a feminist organization hiring only those devoted to the cause of expanded opportunities for women, or a teachers' union hiring only those opposed
to school vouchers. To bar a religious organization from hiring on
a religious basis is to assail the very cause for which the organization
was formed in the first place.
Section 702 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196420 permits religious organizations to make employment decisions based
on religion. 2 1 Occasionally claims are made that the § 702 exemption is waived when an FBO becomes a provider of federally funded
social services. The law is to the contrary. Indeed, charitable
22
choice expressly states that the § 702 exemption is preserved.
Having just promised FBOs that they will not be impaired in their
religious character if they agree to provide social services, it would
be wholly contradictory to deem FBOs to have impliedly waived valuable autonomy rights. Waiver of rights is always disfavored in the
law, and, as would be expected, the credible case law holds that the
§ 702 exemption is not lost when an FBO becomes a provider of
23
publicly funded services.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a). Religious educational institutions are separately

exempt under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e) (2).
21. The Supreme Court held that the Tite VII religious exemption (lid not
violate the Establishment Clause in Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327 (1987).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (Supp. I 1996).
23. Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 62.3-25 (6th Cir.
2000) (dismissing religious discrimination claim filed by employee against religious organization because organization was exempt from Title VII and the receipt
of substantial government funding did not bring about a waiver of the exemption);
Siegel v. Truett-McConnell Coll., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1343-45 (N.D. Ga. 1994),
affd, 73 F.3d 1108 (11 th Cir. 1995) (dismissing religious discrimination claim filed
by faculty member against religious college because college was exempt from Title
VII, the parties could not waive the congressionally created exemption, and students' use of federal grants to pay for tuition did not constitute government advancement of religion); Young v. Shawnee Mission Med. Ctr., No. 88-2321-S, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12248, at *4 -*5. (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 1988) (holding that religious
hospital did not lose Title VII exemption merely because it received thousands of
dollars in federal Medicare payments because such payments did not "transform
[the hospital] into a federally funded institution"); see Arriaga v. Loma Linda
Univ., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621-22 (stating that religious exemption in state employment nondiscrimination law was not lost merely because religious college received
state funding); Saucier v. Employment Sec. Dept., 954 P.2d 285, 288-89 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1998) (finding Salvation Army's religious exemption from state uncmployment compensation tax does not violate Establishment Clause where government
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Occasionally the suggestion is made that, as federal taxpayers,
each of us has a personal right of conscience to not have our taxes
paid to a religious organization via government programs such as
charitable choice. The putative legal claim by such a taxpayer
would be that he or she has a right not to be coerced or othenise
"religiously offended" when general federal revenues end up going
to a religious organization. The idea has a certain superficial appeal, but the law is to the contrary and for good reason.
The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to recognize a federal
taxpayer claim of coercion or other personal religious harm arising
out of government spending. In Tilton v. Richardson,' 4 plaintiffs
claimed that they had been coerced into funding faith-based colleges and other institutions of higher education, in violation of
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause, when a portion of the
money that they had paid in federal taxes went to such institutions.
Finding no plausible evidence of compulsion relating to matters of
faith, the Court held that the plaintiff-taxpayers failed to state a
claim under the Free Exercise Clause.25 In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church and State, Inc.,"-' plaintiffs challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause the transfer
of government surplus property to a religious college. The Supreme Court rebuffed all asserted bases for standing to sue because
the plaintiffs lacked the requisite personal "injury in fact." One of
the rejected claims was that the plaintiffs had a "spiritual stake" in
not having their government give away property to a religious organization or to otherwise act in a manner contrary to no-establishment values. The high court rejected plaintiffs' characterization of
"injury" and stated that where plaintiffs had not alleged any injury,
their spiritual stake in having the government comply with the Es7
tablishment Clause did not confer standing.
As federal citizens our taxes support all manner of policies and
programs with which we deeply disagree. Taxes pay the salaries of
public officials whose policies we despise and oppose at every opgrants funded plaintiff-employee's job because the purpose of the funding %%assecular); Seale v. Jasper Hosp. Dist., No. 09-95-231-CV , 1997 WL 606857, at 04 -*5
(Tex. App. Oct. 2, 1997) (finding Catholic hospital does not waive its rights to
refuse to perform sterilizations and abortions merely because it had a lease ,ith
the government on its building). A rare case to the contrary is distinguished by
the court in Siegel 13 F. Supp. 2d at 134344 (discussing Dodge v. SaIvation Amy.
48 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7 38619 (S.D. Miss. 1989)).

24. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
25. Id. at 689.
26. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).

27. Id. at 486 & n.22.
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portunity. None of these complaints give rise to constitutionally
cognizable "injuries" to us as federal taxpayers. There is no reason
that a federal taxpayer alleging "religious coercion" or being "religiously offended" should, on the merits of the claim, be treated any
differently.
III
Charitable choice requires that social service providers be selected without regard to religion.2 8 Because religion may not be
taken into account in awarding a contract or grant, government
need never face the problem of having to "pick-n-choose" among
competing religious groups. Nor does the government need to determine which groups are "genuinely" religious; once again, religion is irrelevant in the competitive award process.
When discussing the restraints of the Establishment Clause on
generally available programs of aid, this principle of equal treatment or nondiscrimination is termed "neutrality theory." The Sitpreme Court case that most recently addressed the neutrality
principle is Mitchell v. Helms. 29 The four-justice plurality opinion,
written by Justice Thomas and joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, embraced the neutrality principle."" In
the sense of legal positivism, however, Justice O'Connor's opinion
concurring in the judgment is controlling in the lower courts."'
The plurality and concurrence opinions establish that: (1) netutral, indirect aid to a religious organization does not violate the Es28. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) and (c).
29. 530 U.S.793, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (plurality opinion).
30. Before proceeding under the assumption thatJustice O'Connor's opinion
is controlling, at least until the Supreme Court should again address this issue, it is
well to extol the virtues of the plurality opinion. The plurality adopted the neutrality principle without any qualifications. See, e.g., 120 S. Ct. at 2541 (stating that
"[i]f the religious, irreligious and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental
aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient
conducts has been done at the behest of the government"). Hence, the plurality is
not only a bright-line rule of easy and sure application, but brings the constitutional theory of the Establishment Clause-heretofore in confusing disarray-in
line with the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clauses. See Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and the Establishment
Clause, 13 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 285, 300-04 (1999). In the plurality opinion, Justice Thomas said that failing to adhere to the neutrality principle
.would raise serious questions under the Free Exercise Clause." Mitchell, 120 S. Ct.
at 2555 n.19.
31. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2556 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in thejudgment).

Justice Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's opinion.
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tablishment Clause,3 2 and (2) neutral, direct aid to a religious
organization does not, without more, violate the Establishment
Clause. 33 Having indicated that program neutrality is an important
but not sufficient factor in determining the constitutionality of direct aid, Justice O'Connor went on to say that: (a) Meek v. Pitlengey '
and Wolman v. Walte- 5 should be overruled; (b) the Court should
do away with presumptions of unconstitutionality, thus rendering
the "pervasively sectarian" test no longer relevant to the Court's
analysis; (c) proof of actual diversion of government aid to religious
indoctrination would demonstrate a violation of the Establishment
Clause; and (d) while adequate safeguards to prevent diversion are
called for, an intrusive and constant governmental monitoring of

the organization is no longer required.
The issue in Mitchell concerned the scope of the Establishment

Clause when evaluating a program of governmental assistance entailing direct aid to organizations, including religious organizations.3 6 The federal program at issue in Mitchell entailed federal aid
to kindergarten-through-tvelfth-grade ("K-12") schools, public and
private, secular and religious, allocated on a per-student basis. The
same principles apply, presumably, to social service or health care
programs, although the Court has applied closer scrutiny to direct

32. Id. at 2558-59.
33. Id. at 2557.
34. Id. at 2556, 2563-66. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (plurality in

part), had struck down loans to religious schools of maps, photos, fihs, projectors,
recorders, and lab equipment, and it disallowed services for counseling, remedial
and accelerated teaching, psychological, speech, and hearing therapy. Id. at 35355, 363, 372.
35. Mitchell, 120 S.Ct. at 2556, 2563-66. Wohnan v.Walter,433 U.S. 229 (1977)
(plurality in part), upheld use of public funds to provide guidance, remedial and
therapeutic speech and hearing services to pupils attending nonpublic schools, but
struck down state aid for the purchase or loan of instructional materials to religious schools and transportation for field trips by religious school students. Id. at
244-55.
36. Mitchell does not speak-except in the most general way-to tlhe scope of
the Establishment Clause when it comes to other issues such as religious exemptions in regulatory or tax laws, issues of church autonomy, religious symbols on
public property, or religious expression by government officials. In that regard,
Mitchell continues the balkanization of doctrine, that is, different Establishment
Clause tests for different contexts. This splintering of doctrine can be avoided
because a comprehensive and integrated view of the Establishment Clause ispossible. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Strudural &strainton Goarcmental Power, 84 IowA L. Rv. 1 (1998).
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aid to K-12
schools than aid to social welfare and health care
37
services.
In cases involving programs of direct aid to K-12 schools, Justice O'Connor started by announcing that she would follow the
analysis used in Agostini v. Felton.38 She began with the first two
prongs of the three-prong Lemon test:3 9 (1) is there a secular purpose and (2) is the primary effect to advance religion? As plaintiffs
did not contend that the program lacked a secular purpose, she
moved on to the second prong of Lemon.40 Drawing on Agostini,
Justice O'Connor noted that the primary-effect prong is guided by
three criteria. The first two inquiries are whether the aid is diverted
to government indoctrination of religion and whether the program
of aid is neutral with respect to religion. The third criterion, once a
separate prong of the Lemon test but now clearly just a factor under
the primary-effect prong, is whether the program creates excessive
administrative entanglement. 4 1 An alternative analysis would evaluate the same evidence under the effect prong of Lemon pursuant to
Justice O'Connor's no-endorsement test, which asks whether an
"objective observer" would feel civic alienation upon examining the
program of aid.

42

37. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1989) (upholding, on its face,
religiously neutral funding of teenage sexuality counseling centers); Bradfield v.
Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (upholding use of federal funds for construction at
religious hospital).
38. Mithell, 120 S. Ct. at 2556, 2560. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997),
found constitutional a neutral program whereby public school teachers go into
religious schools to deliver remedial educational services.
39. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (stating that previous
Supreme Court decisions had established three criteria for evaluating whether legislation violated the Establishment Clause).
40. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2560. Plaintiffs were wise not to argue that the program lacked a secular purpose. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should It Be
Retained, Reformulated or ReJected?, 4 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETrCuS & PUB. POL'y 513, 51521 (1990) (discussing decisions which illustrate that the secular-purpose prong of
Lemon is easily satisfied when dealing with neutral programs of aid to education,
health care, or social welfare).
41. In Mitchell, plaintiffs did not contend that the program created excessive
administrative entanglement. 120 S. Ct. at 2560. For a survey of cases where the
Supreme Court sought to employ the excessive entanglement test, see Esbeck,
supra note 30, at 304-07.
The Supreme Court has limited the applicability of the "political divisiveness" analysis as an aspect of entanglement analysis. See Esbeck, supra note 13, at 634-35
(collecting authorities).
42. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2560. Endorsement is unlikely unless a facially
neutral program, when applied, singles out religion for favoritism. In MitchellJustice O'Connor little utilized the alternative endorsement test. See id. at 2559. For
criticism of the no-endorsement test because it focuses on individual harm rather

HeinOnline -- 57 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 26 2000

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law

57/2000

FAITH-BASED PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES

27

After reviewing the standard that the Court set forth in Agostini, Justice O'Connor analyzed the facts in Mitchell in light of the
religious neutrality and diversion-to-indoctrination factors. Because
the federal K-12 educational program was unquestionably neutral
as to religion, 43 she devoted most of her analysis to the diversion-toindoctrination factor. Justice O'Connor noted that the educational
aid in question would supplement rather than supplant monies
from private sources, that the nature of the aid was such that it
could not reach the coffers of a religious school, and that the use of
the aid was statutorily restricted to "secular, neutral, and nonideological" purposes. 44 Regarding the nature of the aid, she noted that
the aid consisted of materials and equipment rather than cash, and
that the materials were loaned to the religious schools with the gov45
ernment retaining tile.

Justice O'Connor went on to reject a rule of unconstitutionality that distinguishes different forms of non-monetary aid according
to whether a particular form can be diverted to religious indoctrination, hence overruling Meek and Wohnan.4 6 In doing so, she rejected employing presumptions of unconstitutionality, as the Court
did in Agostini, and stated that she would require proof that the
government aid was actually diverted. 47 Because the "pervasively
sectarian" test makes such a presumption, indeed, an irrebuttable
presumption (i.e., any direct aid to a K-12 parochial school is assumed to advance sectarian or inherently religious objectives);I"
than on policing the line between church and state, see Esbeck, supra note 13, at
631. The endorsement test, if still used by courts facing claims under the Establishment Clause, is more suited to analyzing issues such as those that arise when government displays religious symbols on public property.
43. Religious neutrality, explained Justice O'Connor, ensures that an aid program does not provide a financial incentive for citizens who are intended to ultimately benefit from the aid "to undertake religious indoctrination." Mitchell, 120
S. Ct. at 2561 (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 205).
44. Id. at 2562.
45. Id. On at least one occasion the Supreme Court upheld direct cash payments to religious K-12 schools. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Regan. 444 U.S. 646
(1980). The payments were in reimbursement for state-required testing. Rejecting a rule that cash was never permitted, the Rfgan Court explained, "wle
decline to embrace a formalistic dichotomy that bears so little relationship either
to common sense or the realities of school finance. None of our cases requires us
to invalidate these reimbursements simply because they involve [direct] payments
in cash." Id. at 658. See also Mitchll, 120 S. Ct. at 2546 n.8 (noting that monetary
assistance is not "per se bad").
46. 120 S. Ct at 2562-68.
47. Id. at 2567.
48. See id. at 2561 (noting that Agostini rejected a presumption drawn from
Meek and later Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)); id. at 25634t (quoting Mee,
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Justice O'Connor is best understood to have rendered the "pervasively sectarian" test no longer relevant. 49 Justice O'Connor's opinion seems to require that religious organizations monitor or
"compartmentalize" program aid. 50 If the aid is used for secular
educational functions, then there is no problem. If the aid flows
into the entirety of an educational activity and some "religious indoctrination [is] taking place therein," then that indoctrination
"would be directly attributable to the government."' '
In the final part of her opinion, Justice O'Connor explained
why safeguards in the federal educational program at issue in Mitchell reassured her that the program, as applied, did not violate the
Establishment Clause. A program of aid need not be failsafe, nor
does every program require pervasive monitoring.5 2 The statute
limited aid to "secular, neutral, and nonideological" assistance, reregarding the "pervasively sectarian" rationale and noting it created an irrebuttable presumption which Justice O'Connor later rejects); id. at 2558, 2566-67
(reading out of Bowen v. Kendrick dependence on the "pervasively sectarian" test);
id. at 2567 (requiring proof of actual diversion, thus rendering "pervasively sectarian" test irrelevant); id. at 2568 (rejecting presumption that teachers employed by
religious schools cannot follow statutory requirement that aid be used only for
secular purposes); id. at 2570 (rejecting presumption of bad faith on the part of
religious school officials).
49. WhileJustice O'Connor did notjoin in the plurality's denunciation of the
.pervasively sectarian" doctrine as bigoted, her opinion made plain that the doctrine has now lost all relevance. Justice O'Connor did not, for example, take issue
with the plurality's condemnation of the doctrine as anti-Catholic, and in fact explicitly joined in overruling the specific portions of Meek and Hunt that set forth
the operative core of the "pervasively sectarian" concept. 120 S. Ct. at 256.3-65.
Being a "pervasively sectarian" organization never totally disqualified a school from
receiving direct state aid. For example, the Court repeatedly permitted school bussing and loan of secular textbooks. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968)
(holding constitutional law which required public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all schools, including parochial schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359-62 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-38
(1977); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding constitutional use of
public funds to reimburse bus fare expenses for transport of students to religious
schools). Other aid as well was occasionally upheld such as reimbursement for
mandatory testing, but the line between permitted and prohibited forms of aid was
unclear. Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 660-61 (1980) (upholding
reimbursement of private schools for mandatory testing). Indeed, permitting textbooks but not wall maps, permitting bussing from home but not on field trips, let
the Court in for considerable ridicule. See, e.g., Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2564. This
line drawing was unprincipled, and dispensing with the need for it is yet another
reason to welcome discarding of the "pervasively sectarian" test.
50. 120 S. Ct. at 2568.
51. Id. (explaining why her position in Mitchell is consistent with her position
in Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 398-400 (1985)).
52. Id. at 2569.
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quired that the aid supplement rather than supplant private-source
funds, and expressly prohibited use of the aid for "religious worship
or instruction."5 3 State educational authorities required religious

schools to sign assurances of compliance ith the above-quoted statutory spending prohibition as a term of the contract.A' The state
conducted monitoring visits, albeit infrequently, and randomly reviewed government-purchased library books for their religious content.5 5 Also, local public school districts monitored religious
schools. In doing so, the school districts reviewed the required project proposals that the religious schools submitted, and conducted
annual program-review visits to each recipient school? 6 The districts did catch instances of actual diversion, though not a substan-

tial number, andJustice O'Connor was encouraged by
the fact that
7

when problems were detected they were corrected5
The diversion-prevention factors outlined above are not talismanic. Justice O'Connor expressly declined to elevate them to the
level of constitutional requirements.58 Rather, the factors are to be
weighed according to the nature of the government's program of

aid. 59 In most programs,60 for example, the supplement/supplant
factor makes little sense.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Id. at 2569-70.
57. Id. at 2571-72.
58. Id. at 2572 ("[r]egardless of whether these factors are constitutional

requirements...").
59. Cash payments, for example, are merely one factor to consider under
MitchdL This makes sense given Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Buwen
v. Kendrick, wherein she joined in approving cash grants to religious organizations,
even in the particularly "sensitive" area of teenage sexual behavior, as long as there
is no "use of public funds to promote religious doctrines." Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 623 (1988) (O'Connor,J, concurring). See also Comm. for Pub. Educ. v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646, discussed supra note 45.
60. In CommitteeforPublicEducationv. RNgan, 444 U.S. 646, 660-62 (1980), die
Supreme Court upheld aid that "supplanted" expenses othenise borne by religious schools for state-required testing. Even the dissent in Mitdull concedes that
reconciliation between Regan and an absolute prohibition on aid that supplants
rather than supplements "isnot easily explained." 120 S. CL at 2588 n.17 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Regan suggests that no "blanket rule" exists. Id. at 2544 n.7 (plural-.
ity). It would make no sense to elevate the supplement/supplant distinction to a
principle of law. The Supreme Court's past practice is to trace the government
funds to the point of expenditure, rejecting any analysis whereby government
funds must not be provided so as to "free up" private money which then might be
diverted to religious indoctrination. Carl H. Esbeck, A ConstitutionalCase For Governmental Cooperation With Faith-BasedSocial Senrice Providers, 46 EtoRV L J.1, 17
(1997) (listing cases).
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CONCLUSION
Charitable choice is clearly responsive to many aspects of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Mitchell. First, the legislation authorizing the program of aid expressly prohibits diversion of the aid to
"sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization." 6 1 Second, government-source funds may be kept in accounts separate from an
FBO's private-source funds, and the government may audit the accounts with government funds. 62 Third, the government requires
regular audits by a certified public accountant. The results are to
be submitted to the government, along with a plan of correction if
any noncompliance is uncovered.6 3 Finally, FBOs may self-monitor
and, if need be, segment aspects of their program to ensure that
the government-provided aid is spent only on program activities involving no religious indoctrination. 64
Moreover, nothing in charitable choice prevents officials from
implementing additional procurement regulations such as requiring all providers to sign an Assurance of Compliance promising attention to essential statutory duties. It would be a material breach
of the contract if a provider's conduct did not measure up to the
assurances. It is also common for procurement regulations to require self-audits. Any discrepancies uncovered by a self-audit must
To get a fuller sense of what is important to Justice O'Connor, one should also
consider her multi-factor analyses in her separate opinions in Rosen bergerv. Rector of
thw University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 849-51 (1995), CapitolSquare Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 776-83 (1995), and Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 622-24 (1989). Justice O'Connor is prone to have a list of factors to examine
in light of the totality of the circumstances. However, as her separate opinions
demonstrate, the factors she deems relevant are heavily wedded to the particular
program, policy, or practice under review. The factors Justice O'Connor lists in
Mitchell therefore are not elevated to the level of constitutional requirements.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j) (Supp. 11 1996).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(h). Under the Children's Health Act of 2000, the segregation of accounts is required. Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3305, 114 Stat. 1212, 1214
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-65(g) (2)). This improves accountability with
little loss of organizational autonomy.
63. All federal programs involving financial assistance to nonprofit institutions require annual audits by a certified public accountant whenever the nonprofit receives $300,000 or more in a year in total federal awards. Audits of States,
Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 35,278, 35,28935,302 (June 30, 1997). The independent audit is not just of financial expenditures, but includes a review for program compliance.
64. Justice O'Connor nowhere defined what she meant by "religious indoctrination." The Supreme Court has found that prayer, devotional Bible reading, veneration of the Ten Commandments, classes in confessional religion, and the
biblical creation story taught as science are all inherently religious. See Esbeck,
supra note 30, at 307-08 (collecting cases).
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be promptly reported to the government along ith a plan to correct the deficiency. These procurement policies would, of course,
have to be equally applicable to secular providers, and none of the
details of the procurement requirements could intrude on the "religious character" of FBOs. Charitable choice facially satisfies the
parameters of Justice O'Connor's Mitchell opinion, and for most
FBOs it can be applied in accord with her requirements as well.
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